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 Constitutional Identity and the Identity of the People:  
The Constitutional Conceptualization of Non-Status  
and Off-Reserve Indigenous Populations in Canada
Jula HugHes ⃰
Abstract. This article focuses on the issue of the relationship between constitutional recognition and constitutional 
imposition of identity. The Canadian state in its constitutional document describes itself as a liberal democracy 
governing a pluralist society. It also recognizes Aboriginal rights as constitutive. The first two elements have met 
with considerable success in terms of aligning state and citizen identity. This suggests that neutral constitutional 
identities or identities that respect individual diversity can be imposed successfully through the democratic process. 
However, these are not effective in meeting decolonizing objectives, which must instead be pursued through 
respecting Indigenous self-governance.
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1. INTRODUCTION: FROM LIBERALISM TO LEGAL PLURALISM
In a recent article on constitutional identity, Richard Albert observed that ‘constituent power 
theory refers to the people as an amorphous whole, with neither quantification nor 
qualification of who the people are’.1 Despite lacking an introductory ‘We, the People’, the 
Canadian constitution may appear to be doing just that. In its first section, the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the ‘Charter’) describes Canada as a ‘free and democratic 
society’2 without any specification as to who the people in this society may be. The use of 
broad inclusive language is consistent with classical liberal theory, which contemplates the 
constitutional subject of ‘the People’ in neutral and universalist terms.
Yet, a review of later parts of the Charter reveals a more textured, pluralist approach 
that is layered over the universalist beginning. In the equality rights guarantee, the Charter 
speaks inter alia to the racial, national, ethnic, religious, gender and bodily diversity of the 
People. Other parts address linguistic and cultural diversity as constitutive of Canadian 
society. The pluralist idea that a single free and democratic society, the constitutional 
identity of the Canadian state, can accommodate within itself a population of individuals 
with multi-dimensional diversities allows Canadians of many political stripes and 
backgrounds to see themselves in the constitutional mirror. 
This capacity of the constitution to reflect back an image of state identity that invites 
people to self-identify with the state is a powerful mechanism that promotes identity 
alignment between the individual and the state. When the constitutional text, and one might 
argue, public discourse, fails to engage people in this way, there appears to be a widespread 
sense of being left out. The present idea has animated pluralist conceptions of constitutional 
law and encouraged legislators to respond to the demands of historically disadvantaged 
or excluded groups for inclusion through textual constitutional recognition. This has 
*  Professor and Dean, Bora Laskin Faculty of Law, Lakehead University (Canada), dean.law@
lakeheadu.ca.
1 Albert (2018) 6. 
2 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the 
Canada Act, 1982 c. 11 (U.K.).
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resulted in the inclusion of express language in some constitutional texts of the 20th century 
including the Canadian Charter. By contrast, the universalist language of the equality clause 
in the 14th Amendment of the US Constitution could be considered as an example of the 
classical liberal position. 
The pluralist innovation of textual recognition of specific identities has responded to 
concerns of exclusion for equality-seeking groups but has been seen as going too far 
for some and not far enough for others. What used to be thought of as remedial constitutional 
language addressing past exclusion is now being mobilized for the constitutional recognition 
for members of privileged majorities. Ran Hirschl, in a very useful article from a 
comparative and international perspective, described this trend as a kind of resistance to 
global (universalist and/or pluralist) constitutional convergence.3 He suggested that the 
resistance is often motivated by political populism and that it asserts majoritarianism, 
parochialism and national parliamentary sovereignty as key values. 
At the same time as a populist backlash reaching across national boundaries has 
contended that constitutional recognition of diverse minority identities has gone too far, the 
pluralist project has also not been entirely effective in winning the hearts and minds of  ome 
of Canada’s most marginalized communities. A prominent example is the relationship of 
the Canadian state with people who identify as Indigenous. Despite active participation 
of Indigenous leaders in the constitutional conferences of the 1980s and the inclusion of 
textual references to Aboriginal rights in Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
Indigenous people, community leaders, activists and academics describe a deep fissure 
between self-identity and the Canadian legal order as expressed in the constitution.4 
This paper tilts away from majoritarian claims to textual recognition which dominate 
the current discussion of constitutional identity. It instead addresses why textual 
constitutional recognition may be inadequate and what modes of constitutional recognition 
may address the inadequacy. 
Specifically, the article explores why the express textual constitutional recognition of 
Indigenous Peoples in the Canadian constitutional text has fallen short of performing the 
task of effective constitutional recognition is explored. How is it that a litany of court cases, 
political action, learned and community activist writing has not resulted in a constitutional 
text and discourse that gives many Indigenous people even a glimpse of themselves in the 
constitutional mirror? In asking this question, there is no intention to advance a normative 
argument that Indigenous people ‘should’ identify themselves with the Canadian state.5 
Rather, exploring the question may help to think through the relationship between 
constitutional recognition and constitutional imposition of identity. It may also help us 
understand better the tension between recognition and self-determination experienced by 
Indigenous Peoples in their relationship with the Canadian state. 
In a post-colonial society, the goal of a ‘workable constitutional identity’6 may 
ultimately be entirely elusive. At the bare minimum, it is clear that constitutional recognition 
for Indigenous Peoples requires something different than either state imposition of a 
majoritarian vision or state recognition of pluralist or multicultural individual identities. 
3 Hirschl (2018) 1. 
4 Green (2017) 175., Coulthard (2007) 437.
5 Coulthard (2007) 6.
6 Rosenfeld (2009) 132. 
323CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY AND THE IDENTITY OF THE PEOPLE....
Neither recognition regimes grounded in universalist or pluralist constitutional theories 
based on the ‘sovereignty of a people’ are adequate to the task of addressing recognition 
demands by Indigenous Peoples. 
These theories fail because, as Larry Chartrand has argued, neither democratic 
nor sovereignty-based recognition can legitimate the state for Indigenous Peoples.7 
An underlying reason for this lack of legitimacy is that the state misses two essential 
elements that are necessary for the social contract to function: the origin of the social 
contract must be imagined to be ultimately voluntary and it must be lost in the mists of 
history. Neither is true for Indigenous Peoples as the social contract is demonstrably neither 
voluntary nor ahistorical. Instead, it was imposed violently and is remembered as a specific 
historical event. It is important not to misstate this difference between the liberal master 
narrative and the constitutional situation of Indigenous Peoples. 
The issue is not that an illegal act cannot give rise to a legitimate legal order. The rise 
of a constitutional order from despotic ashes is more common than not and many liberal 
democracies found their existence on violent overthrow. Instead, the issue is the ongoing 
legal and constitutional subordination of Indigenous Peoples in the context of an otherwise 
liberal democracy – the transition from a colonial government to a democratic one was not 
sufficiently radical to accomplish what Michel Rosenfeld has described as one of two 
essential factors for political transformation: 
‘a move away from old habits and obsolete self-images for purposes of evolution 
towards a new collective self-identity suited to the emergent political and institutional 
order.’8 
In characterizing this historical and political situation as the impossibility of liberating 
constitutional identity renders problematic the long quest of Indigenous activists, 
particularly of Indigenous women, for constitutional and legal recognition.9
It is argued that tolerance for and indeed support of, a different kind of pluralism 
is needed. A form of legal pluralism is required where the state acknowledges and defers 
to Indigenous governance institutions as imbued with their own inherent power of 
constitutional recognition. Canada has partially moved in this direction when First Nations 
communities were recognized as having the power to determine their own membership.10 
It is now moving further in this direction in a consultation exercise directed by the Canadian 
Senate in response to a decision by the Quebec Superior Court in Descheneaux. 
This path is consistent with the ancient and persistent claim of First Peoples to self-
determination and the more recent assertion of rights of Indigenous Peoples under 
UNDRIP.11 Its full implementation opens up the possibility of a new, legally pluralistic 
phase in Canadian constitutional lawmaking. 
This paper proceeds in three parts. The first part situates the issue of recognition 
powers in Canadian constitutional law. From the constitutional texts and key decisions of 
the Supreme Court of Canada from Powley to Daniels and Descheneaux, the first part 
  7 Chartrand (2016) 167.
  8 Rosenfeld (2009) 130. 
  9 Green (2017). 
10 Bill C-31: An Act to Amend the Indian Act (S.C. 1985, c.27).
11 UN General Assembly, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: 
resolution adopted by the General Assembly, 2 October 2007, A/RES/61/295.
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demonstrates that Canadian law has circumscribed but not resolved the issue of recognition 
for Indigenous Peoples. 
The second part seeks out entities that have the potential or actual capacity to perform 
the function of constitutional recognition for Indigenous Peoples. It describes the existing 
landscape of Indigenous self-governance and representational claims and considers in 
particular organizations that seek to represent Indigenous people who are not recognized by 
the state, in particular the Congress of Aboriginal Peoples. 
The third part provides a case study of membership recognition of CAP affiliated 
Native Councils in the Maritime provinces. The case study sought to determine to what 
extent the processes used by Native Councils accord with the demands of the constitutional 
jurisprudence. It demonstrates the capacity of one set of self-governance organizations to 
address the recognition issue left unresolved by Canadian constitutional law. The paper 
concludes that legally pluralistic approaches can be effective as long as state law respects 
Indigenous self-governance organizations as communities of recognition. 
2. THE INADEQUACY OF TEXTUAL RECOGNITION
The Canadian constitutional texts speak to Canada’s Indigenous populations in different 
places. Three of these are very well known including references in the federal power 
provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867, in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
and the Aboriginal Rights section of the Constitution Act, 1982.
The Constitution Act, 1867 establishes in Section 91(24) the power to legislate with 
respect to ‘Indians and land reserved for Indians’. Section 25 of the Charter safeguards 
Aboriginal rights from abrogation or derogation through Charter claims. Finally, Section 35 
of the Constitution Act, 1982 constitutionally entrenches existing Aboriginal rights. It also 
defines ‘Aboriginal’ to include ‘Indian, Inuit and Métis Peoples’; permits for the 
development of new rights through treaty and protects gender equality with respect to these 
rights. Less well-known places in the constitutionally relevant texts can be found in 
constitutional documents from the 1930s that sought to put Western provinces on the same 
footing as the founding Eastern provinces, generally referred to as the Natural Resources 
Transfer Agreements.12 Importantly, these agreements imposed on the provinces obligations 
incurred by the federal Crown vis-á-vis Indigenous populations.13 The Supreme Court 
agreed with the federal government’s position and held that, under paragraph 2 of the 
NRTAs, the provinces had agreed to undertake all outstanding obligations owed by the 
federal government prior to the NRTAs.14 
None of these textual references in the constitutional Acts, be they top-of-mind or 
more obscure, specify either a process for identifying who is an Aboriginal person or 
community, or for that matter a substantive definition.15 And yet, some process is necessary 
12 The Supreme Court of Canada held in R v Blais, [2003] 2 SCR 236, 2003 SCC 44 that 
hunting rights guaranteed to ‘Indians’ under the NRTA did not extend to the Métis. In Daniels v 
Canada (Indian Affairs and Northern Development), [2016] 1 SCR 99, 2016 SCC 12, the Supreme 
Court of Canada distinguished Blais on the basis that the interpretation of a constitutional agreement 
attracted different interpretive principles (though the Court did not identify what they might be). 
13 Reference re Refunds of Dues re Timbre Permits, [1933] SCR 616, aff’d In re Refund of 
Dues Paid Under s. 4769 of the Timber Regulations in Manitoba, British Columbia, Saskatchewan 
and Alberta, [1935] AC 184 (PC) See also: O’Byme (2006) 215. 
14 O’Byme (2006) 229. 
15 McNeil (1982) 255. 
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because identity, including Indigenous identity, is a complex matter; and being included or 
being excluded has important legal consequences.16 
Canadian state law has adopted two approaches: legislation supported by administrative 
action; and jurisprudential development of criteria. The legislative approach is limited to 
Indigenous populations falling under the Indian Act. For individual recognition, the key 
administrative action supporting the Indian Act is the maintenance of the Indian Register, a 
list of status Indians and their band membership, if any. The jurisprudential approach has 
been used categorically/collectively to answer questions about the scope of federal 
jurisdiction over Inuit,17 non-status Indians,18 and Métis people.19 It has also been used 
individually to determine whether a particular person is a rights-holder. None of the state 
law delves into the identity of people as members of the many different nations;20 in the 
territories where the research for this paper was conducted, people identify as Mi’kmaq, 
Wolastoqey (or Maliseet), Passamaquoddy and collectively as Wabanaki. They may also 
describe themselves as Indigenous, Aboriginal or Native in their relationship with settler 
society but these labels tend not to be used as intra-group relational terms. 
There is no single Aboriginal nation in Canada, nor are there three nations that 
self-identify in the terms of the expanded definition of Section 35. As a result, the 
constitutional question whether an individual is Aboriginal for the purposes of Section 35 
or an ‘Indian’ for the purposes of Section 91(24) is not answered by looking to a single 
collective (national or otherwise) of Aboriginal people but is instead analyzed by looking to 
other collectivities at the community or tribal/national level. 
The constitutional text does not provide any detail on criteria or processes of 
recognition and is thus analogous to the constitutional regime of Canadian citizenship. 
In granting democratic rights to Canadian citizens in Section 3 of the Charter, the 
constitutional text is silent on the criteria for Canadian citizenship – it also does not 
elaborate on the procedures for acquiring or asserting citizenship. These details can, 
however, be found in ordinary legislation, viz. the Citizenship Act. 
The only ordinary legislation dealing with Indigenous identity is the Indian Act. Even 
on the face of the constitutional text, it is apparent that this Act does not match the categories 
of rights holders in Section 35 (the Act does not apply to Métis or Inuit). Constitutional 
case law further clarifies that federal jurisdiction over ‘Indians’ in Section 91(24) is not 
limited to people with status under the Indian Act. Thus, the Act fails to provide the kind of 
comprehensive substantive and procedural regime found in the Citizenship Act. It is under-
inclusive. 
The demographic realities further highlight the under-inclusive nature of the statutory 
scheme of recognition. The Canadian census regularly reveals that many more people 
identify as Aboriginal than are recognized by the state under the Act. A significant majority 
of people who self-identify as Aboriginal in Canada do not reside in a First Nation 
community (reserve community). This includes First Nations people residing off reserve, 
Métis and Inuit. Latest census data indicates that there were 744,855 First Nations people 
with registered or treaty Indian status in 2016, accounting for just over three-quarters 
(76.2%) of the First Nations population. There is a strong trend towards urbanization. 
16 Grammond (2009).
17 Reference as to whether “Indians” includes in Section 91 (24) of the B.N.A. Act includes 
Eskimo in habitants of the Province of Quebec, [1939] S.C.R. 104.
18 Daniels v Canada (Indian Affairs and Northern Development), [2016] 1 SCR 99, 2016 SCC.
19 Daniels v Canada (Indian Affairs and Northern Development), [2016] 1 SCR 99, 2016 SCC.
20 Patterson (2006). Swachuk (2001) 73. 
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Among the 744,855 First Nations people with registered or treaty Indian status, 44.2% lived 
on reserve in 2016, while the rest of the population lived off reserve. There is also very 
significant growth in the non-status population. The 23.8% of First Nations which did not 
have registered Indian status, has grown by 75.1% since 2006 to 232,375 people in 2016. 
This is not to suggest that every single person self-identifying in the census and/or seeking 
recognition through a non-status organization should necessarily be so recognized, nor 
that all of these organizations are appropriately thought of as communities of recognition. 
This merely points out that there is a significant gap between self-identification and state 
recognition. Beyond claiming Indigenous identity, many more people self-describe as 
having an Indigenous ancestry.
Further, census data and data maintained under the Indian Register do not match up 
and there are some doubts about both sets of numbers. For example, the census identifies 
744,855 status Indians compared to 970,562 status Indians registered in the Indian Register. 
The discrepancy supports assumptions in Indigenous circles that the census figures are 
under-reporting. Indigenous experts believe that this is because of the significant risk of 
facing racism and adverse treatment. Sawchuk notes that the very process of claiming 
Aboriginal identity is full of ironies caused by the implicit attorning to the state law 
mechanisms of recognition.21 Conversely, being perceived as Aboriginal is often a matter of 
choice. Many Aboriginal people, particularly in Eastern Canada, are not perceived as 
Aboriginal by mainstream society unless they make a point of self-identification, effectively 
coming out as Indigenous.22 Thus, in the absence of self-identification, many Aboriginal 
folk are invisible to the mainstream in their constitutional identity.
 A particularly striking example of this constitutional invisibility can be found in 
Newfoundland. When Newfoundland joined Confederation in 1949, the Terms of Union 
were silent on any Indigenous population. Consequently, the Indian Act was not applied to 
the new province of Newfoundland and no reserves were set aside.23 Subsequent agreements 
recognized and addressed benefits for Inuit and Innu populations of Southern Labrador, 
while Mi’kmaq populations continued to be ignored. As is often the case in Canadian 
Indigenous-settler relations, the historical record for the reasons of addressing Indigenous 
issues in this manner are mixed. Some aspects of the records seem to suggest deliberate 
neglect, while others entertain questions of detrimental effects of depriving native 
Newfoundlanders of previously enjoyed rights and privileges as full citizens of that country 
in the new context as a Canadian province. 
All sides were unsure of the size of the population but estimated them to be in the 
hundreds. The Federation of Newfoundland Indians was founded in order to give voice to 
this Indigenous population and in 1989 the Federation filed suit in Federal Court seeking to 
assert a constitutional equality right to recognition under s.15 of the Charter. This matter 
was never heard on the merits but an agreement was reached to permit Newfoundland 
Mi’kmaq people to register. Prior to registration, estimates ran in the order of 10,000 
individuals who might be eligible. Registration exceeded 100,000. About 80,000 
registrations were denied and in a second cut, number of individuals who had previously 
been given Indian Act status had that status removed.24 
21 Sawchuk (2001). 
22 Thank you to Janelle Marchand for our discussion on the similarities between coming out as 
Indigenous and coming out as LGTBQ.
23 MacKenzie (2010) 1719. 
24 Thomson, link 3.
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As a practical matter, state recognition is not entirely limited to Indian status, as the 
Canadian government has long recognized other Indigenous populations in addition to 
status Indians. The jurisdictional distribution and rights associated with Indigenous status 
other than status under the Indian Act remained, however poorly understood.
Furthermore, state recognition has endemic discriminatory features. There is a long 
history of Canadian state law describing and recognizing Indigenous individuals and 
communities in an under-inclusive, discriminatory and divisive manner.25 These include a 
long history of gender discrimination, family status discrimination,26 age discrimination,27 
and discrimination on the basis of occupation.28 There have been multiple legislative 
attempts to address the gender discriminatory features of the Indian Act, including Bills 
C-31, C-3 and most recently S-3 in response to extensive rights litigation including litigation 
at the level of the United Nations.29 The latest legislative round was most revealing in that 
the government opposed an amendment that worked to truly eliminate gender discrimination 
on the basis that that would result in too many people of undisputed Aboriginal ancestry 
being recognized as status Indians under the Act. Gender discrimination also resulted in 
over-inclusiveness as non-Indigenous women who married Indigenous men acquired status 
and were able to pass status on to their children. 
Given the parsimony and misalignments of the constitutional text and the absence of 
comprehensive statutory definitions, there is a significant body of case law that has 
attempted to address these issues. The Supreme Court of Canada first articulated the legal 
test for Aboriginal identity for purposes of determining whether someone was an Aboriginal 
rights-holder under s. 35 in 2003 in the Powley decision.30 The test is a close analogue to 
the approach taken by Australian legislation and jurisprudence.31 It includes three elements: 
self-identification, ancestral connection and community recognition. Much has been written 
about the first two elements while the third element has received less attention.32 Very 
briefly, the first element, self-identification is a primarily individual matter. Courts are 
looking to the individual to self-identify as for example Mi’kmaq or Cree, as Métis or Inuit. 
Problems arise with some frequency related to the timing and lived experience of self-
identification but the criterion is not conceptually difficult. 
Ancestral connection and community recognition are more complex. This is in part 
because they overlap – ancestral connection is inevitably a factor in community recognition 
and is sometimes the controlling factor. It is also complex from an evidentiary perspective 
because ancestral connection requires a recognized ancestor. Further, it is often entangled 
with essentialist rules regarding blood quantum and complicated by varying practices 
of custom adoption, patterns of intermarriage and territorial displacement, colonial 
patrilineality and mixed approaches to genealogy in Indigenous legal systems. 
25 Hughes – Stewart (2015) 263. 
26 Gehl v Canada (Attorney General), 2017 ONCA 319.
27 An example is the 1951 cut-off rule.
28 Section 99 of the Indian Act dealing with enfranchisement of university graduates and 
professional qualifications (1880 amendment).
29 Sandra Lovelace v Canada, Communication No. 24/1977: Canada 30/07/81, UN Doc. CCPR/
C/13/D/24/1977 prompted Bill C-31. 
30 R v Powley, [2003] 2 SCR 207.
31 Gardiner–Garden (2003). 
32 Sawchuk (2001), Grammond (2009), de Costa (2014) 55.
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This paper focuses on the least explored aspect of the third element, community 
acceptance is focused on and interrogate the criteria and processes that might lead to state 
law recognition of a community as a community with the power of recognition. The Powley 
test presupposes and the Court in Powley accepts that there is a recognized community that 
has the power of recognition and the capacity to exercise this power. Yet, what constitutes a 
community with the power of recognition is contested and unclear. There are no legislative 
criteria for recognizing a community of recognition and populations outside of the Indian 
Act regime are poorly understood.33 There is no comprehensive ethnographical study of 
non-status and off-reserve populations.34 The jurisprudence is also underdeveloped. 
In Powley, the Supreme Court of Canada noted the importance of community self-definition 
as well as the establishment of standardized and objectively verifiable membership criteria. 
The Court also linked the issue of identity to the purpose of Métis rights under Section 35, 
which it held to be ‘to recognize and affirm the rights of the Métis held by virtue of their 
direct relationship to this country’s original inhabitants and by virtue of the continuity 
between their customs and traditions and those of their Métis predecessors’ (at para 29). 
There are other cases where the Court has taken a less purely historical view of the purpose 
of Section 35 rights, which may also be relevant here.
 Thus, the Court has accepted that communities can and should self-define and has 
encouraged standardized and verifiable membership criteria and processes. At the same 
time, the Court has cautioned Métis organizations that their membership processes may not 
be determinative, depending on the requirements and the role of the organization in the 
community
Membership in a Métis political organization may be relevant to the question of 
community acceptance but it is not sufficient in the absence of a contextual 
understanding of the membership requirements of the organization and its role in the 
Métis community.35
It is not entirely clear what kind of contextual understanding would allow a court to 
place reliance on the membership process of an Indigenous political organization. It is even 
less obvious how a court would go about evaluating the role of an organization in a 
community. Even the unit of analysis, community, is problematic. It appears to envision 
a village-by-village recognition process, which may be close to or very far removed from a 
particular Indigenous legal tradition and practice. It may also create barriers for non-status 
Indigenous people whose community is political and does not have a clear geographical 
boundary. 
The Supreme Court of Canada had the opportunity to provide more guidance in the 
Daniels case. The Court recognized that Métis and non-status people were to be considered 
‘Indians’ for the purposes of federal jurisdiction pursuant to Section 91(24) of the 
Constitution Act, 1867 but in a sparse decision retreated to the view that individual identity 
had to be determined on a case-by-case basis without further elaboration.36 To make matters 
33 Grammond – Groulx (2012) 33.
34 We conducted a study with respect to four distinct populations in New Brunswick that are 
represented by the New Brunswick Aboriginal Peoples Council, the provincial affiliate of CAP. 
Hughes – Stewart – Plummer (2015). 
35 R v Powley, para 33.
36 Daniels v Canada (Indian Affairs and Northern Development), [2016] 1 SCR 99, 2016 SCC, 
para 47. 
329CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY AND THE IDENTITY OF THE PEOPLE....
more complex, the Court also noted in Daniels that the community acceptance test was 
inapplicable to the determination of jurisdiction for purposes of Section 91(24) of the 
Constitution Act, 1867. This was because the Court was concerned that the application of a 
community acceptance test was liable to exclude individuals who were no longer accepted 
by their communities as a result of state action including the removal of Indigenous children 
from their communities in the Indian Residential School system.37 It is not obvious why this 
history of state-sponsored exclusion would not be equally relevant to the scope of Aboriginal 
rights or the recognition of political communities organizing non-status people. 
The latest iteration of grappling with the inadequacies of the statutory recognition 
scheme was prompted by the decision of the Quebec Superior Court in Descheneaux v 
Canada in August of 2015. The Court declared key provisions of the Indian Act inoperative 
because they unjustifiably violated equality rights under the Charter. This followed the 
amendments to the Indian Act in Bill C-31 in 1985 and C-3 in 2011, both of which had 
responded to earlier judicial findings of gender discrimination with respect to eligibility for 
Indian registration. Descheneaux is the progeny of earlier decisions in the Lovelace and 
McIver cases in the most literal sense, as it traces the intergenerational effects of sex 
discrimination of these earlier cases to the descendants of the male and female lines. 
The political response to Descheneaux also initially followed an established pattern.38 
The government proposed to amend the Indian Act to respond to the particularized issues of 
the court case while also indicating an intention to maintain other discriminatory elements 
of the regime in order to avoid recognition of a large number of descendants who were 
similarly but not identically affected by other gender discriminatory aspects of the Indian 
Act recognition regime. 
However, the Members of the Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples 
insisted that a more fulsome reform be initiated and that the Indian Act be purged of 
its gender discriminatory aspects once and for all. In Bill S-3, the senators forced 
the government’s hand by introducing a broader amendment the purpose of which was 
‘to entitle to registration (…) those persons who were previously not entitled to registration 
(…) as a result of the preferential treatment accorded to Indian men over Indian women 
born prior to April 17, 1985 and to patrilineal descendants over matrilineal descendants 
born prior to April 17, 1985. 
The Indian Act was amended in December of 2017 and Parliament included in the law 
an elaborate, two-phased consultation process on issues regarding Indian registration, band 
membership and First Nation citizenship. The first stage, scheduled for May of 2018, saw a 
report on the outcome of a co-created consultation process. The second stage sets out an 
ambitious one-year timeline for reporting back results in June of 2019. The third stage, 
scheduled for the end of 2020 will evaluate whether S-3 was successful in eliminating 
gender discrimination from the Indian Act. Part of the consultation will consider ‘the 
continued federal government role in determining Indian status and band membership’. 
This promises a shift in Canadian law towards greater respect for Indigenous self-
governance. 
Further support for Indigenous self-governance and state law toleration comes from 
emergent legal standards in international law as well as important Canadian academic 
commentary. The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples supports 
37 Daniels v Canada (Indian Affairs and Northern Development), [2016] 1 SCR 99, 2016 SCC, 
para 49. 
38 Cossette, link 1. 
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Indigenous claims to self-determination of identity, firmly locating the power of recognition 
with Indigenous jurisdiction. Article 33 of UNDRIP acknowledges a right of Indigenous 
Peoples to determine their own identity or membership. Specifically, it provides:
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine their own identity or membership in 
accordance with their customs and traditions. This does not impair the right of 
indigenous individuals to obtain citizenship of the States in which they live.
Article 33 goes further and recognizes not merely jurisdiction over individual 
recognition but also a right to collective self-determination of structures and institutions. 
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine the structures and to select the 
membership of their institutions in accordance with their own procedures.
It is the collective of a People that has the right to determine the structures and 
institutions that operationalize self-governance. Groups have a right of recognition and 
individuals’ rights to membership are contingent on that recognition and yet the group is 
constituted by the people recognized. The idea animating these guarantees is that settler 
governments may not usurp the power of recognition nor do they have jurisdiction over the 
choice of institutions and structures or Indigenous procedures associated with their 
establishment or maintenance.
Claims for self-governance regarding membership have met with support from some 
important settler scholars in the area as well.39 For example, Prof. Grammond (now Justice 
Grammond) in his seminal text on membership and recognition has convincingly argued in 
favour of autonomy of representative minority (Indigenous) institutions.
Those institutions are in a better position than the state to define what constitutes the 
ethnicity of the group. Moreover, while the state may adopt membership criteria that 
result in the oppression of the minority (for example, the criteria of the old Indian Act), 
a minority is less likely to do so. The right of self-determination in international law, 
as well as its domestic manifestations (such as the aboriginal right to self-government), 
also militate for the recognition of the power of self-definition for minorities.40 
The various difficulties evident in state law, including the long history of gender 
discrimination under the Indian Act as well as the Minister’s plea for delay in response to 
Bill S-3 may suggest to some that the issue is complex or even intractable. Contrary to this 
perception, it can be shown that the essential elements for a functioning and non-
discriminatory regime have long been known and, importantly, practiced by Aboriginal 
organizations representing Indigenous populations41 outside of or beyond the Indian 
Act. These practices are born of the universal assertion of jurisdiction over membership, 
identity and recognition by Indigenous Peoples in Canada and they align with the overall 
trend in Canadian law to increase self-governance over membership. 
39 Green (2001) 715, Sayers et al. (2001); Napoleon (2009) 233. 
40 Grammond (2009) 190.
41 I am using the term populations rather than Peoples not to detract from the recognition of 
Indigenous Peoples as Peoples, but instead to acknowledge the diasporic nature of many Indigenous 
people living in Canada off-reserve and/or outside of their traditional territories.
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3. ABORIGINAL GOVERNMENTAL BODIES
In this context, it is important to at least briefly recall the current institutional landscape of 
Aboriginal governments and organizations in Canada. There are broadly speaking three sets 
of players in the Canadian political landscape: First Nations (Indian Act) communities, 
tribal organizations and national Aboriginal organizations. First Nations communities have 
express power of recognition to the extent that they have the power to create their own 
membership codes.42 They are limited in their power of recognition by being subject to the 
federal power of recognition exercised under Section 6 of the Indian Act. Thus, the power 
of recognition for communities regulated by the Indian Act is split into a state law status 
power and a community membership power. The integration between the two remains 
precarious. 
A more recent addition is the reemergence of traditional tribal governance structures 
which include hereditary chiefs, nation-based councils and inter-nation confederacies. They 
draw on ancient governance structures but typically do not intend to replicate their historical 
predecessors. In this sense, they are not driven by historical revivalism, rather, they aim 
to step outside of the many divides created for Indigenous people by settler law 
including federal/provincial, status/non-status, on-reserve/off-reserve, the various categories 
of ‘Indianness’ under Section 6 of the Indian Act and so on. However, the vast majority of 
federal spending supporting Indigenous governance is directed to First Nations communities 
under the Indian Act. Thus, traditional governance organizations tend to lack the resources 
and institutional set-up to fully carry out political representation functions. It remains to be 
seen whether they will be able to muster the resources and support necessary for sustained 
political functioning. For present purposes, they are less relevant because they have yet to 
develop formal membership processes.
Thirdly, beyond the community or tribal/national level, what remains to be considered 
are national Aboriginal organizations and their provincial and territorial affiliates. As seen, 
Canada recognizes three collectivities of Indigenous Peoples: First Nations, Métis and Inuit. 
At the implementation level, the federal government works with three, four or five national 
organizations depending on the political orientation of the government of the day and/or 
issues at stake. The five organizations represent or seek to represent the three collectivities 
referenced in state law. Most of these organizations or their direct predecessors formed in 
the late 1960s and emerged as important players in the constitutional conferences leading 
up to the patriation of the Canadian Constitution in 1982. In their current iterations, these 
are the Assembly of First Nations (AFN), the Métis National Council (MNC), the Inuit 
Tapiriit Katami (ITK), the Native Women’s Association of Canada (NWAC) and the 
Congress of Aboriginal Peoples (CAP). 
The AFN’s structure is closely tied to the Indian Act and its governance structures, as 
the key decision-making body, the Assembly, is made up of chiefs elected pursuant to the 
Indian Act. Its representational claim goes beyond this core constituency and includes 
people living off-reserve ‘in cities and towns across the country’. 
The MNC claims to represent the Métis. In contrast to the AFN and its broad 
representational claim, the representational claim of the MNC has been shrinking. The 
MNC does not now seek to represent all people of mixed Indigenous and settler descent.43 
Instead, it requires that its members trace their ancestry to a single ‘historic Metis Nation’, 
42 Indian Act, RSC 1985, c I-5 Section 10. 
43 Sawchuk (2001) 19.
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which is geographically bounded in Canada’s northwest. The MNC has a formal 
membership process that expressly references the Powley decision and seeks to meet the 
criteria set out there. 
The ITK seeks to represent Inuit focused on 53 communities spread across the 
Inuvialuit Settlement Region (Northwest Territories), Nunavut, Nunavik (Northern Quebec) 
and Nunatsiavut (Northern Labrador). Membership processes are carried out regionally and 
representation by the ITK is tied to membership in one of the regional bodies. 
NWAC represents Indigenous women. It does not act as a community of recognition 
despite representing key interests related to identity and recognition. 
Finally, CAP represents off-reserve and non-status people. Membership is addressed 
at the provincial and territorial level through affiliates often referred to as Native Councils. 
It is readily apparent that CAP and NWAC have partially overlapping constituencies with 
the previous three organizations. Equally, it is apparent that the first three organizations do 
not represent all Indigenous people in Canada or, put in more constitutionally relevant 
terms, all people who hold rights under Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, either 
from the perspective of Indigenous people or, indeed from the perspective of the state as 
expressed by Prime Minister Trudeau44 and the Supreme Court of Canada.45 
From this context, a number of important issues with respect to recognition can be 
discerned. Firstly, recognition is at its core a relational issue. It is not an ontological claim 
to ‘being Indigenous’, rather it concerns the interface between state law and Indigenous 
governance as well as the interface between Indigenous governments with representational 
claims. It is a place where different legal and identity systems must speak to each other. 
Secondly, the processes and criteria must be cognizable and legitimate to the different legal 
systems involved, even if they do not exactly replicate each other. They must operate with 
mutual awareness and respect. Finally, the context of recognition is highly dynamic. Due to 
the various political and legal pressures that are exerted on any entity exercising jurisdiction 
with respect to recognition, one should expect change over time.
4. CASE STUDY – MEMBERSHIP IN NATIVE COUNCILS
In this regard, it seemed promising to look to the practice of Native Councils as Indigenous 
organizations with representational claims for historically excluded non-status and off-
reserve populations for guidance on issues of identity and recognition. These organizations 
exercising the power of recognition are constantly navigating the interface between settler 
law and Indigenous self-governance and must balance divergent sets of interests: 
recognizing the Indigeneity of individuals so recognized by their existing membership; 
excluding from membership those who do not meet the criteria set by the existing 
membership so as not to unduly dilute available rights and benefits; positioning their 
representational claim vis-à-vis other Indigenous organizations and maintaining a system of 
membership recognition that is cognizable to the settler legal order. 
Membership in Native Councils is generally processed based on a written application. 
The criteria for granting membership may be described as Powley Plus in the sense that all 
Councils require evidence of Aboriginal ancestry, self-identification and community 
involvement and additional criteria such as residence, age and participation requirements. 
Challenging questions arise in the context of applications that seek recognition for new 
44 Prime Minister’s Office, link 2.
45 Daniels v Canada (Indian Affairs and Northern Development), [2016] 1 SCR 99, 2016 SCC. 
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lines of genealogy and also in the context of cases of unknown paternity as well as custom 
adoption. Membership issues also sometimes arise because of changes in federal law and 
administration. For these reasons, membership processes continue to evolve to better reflect 
an evolving understanding of the relationship between ancestry, community and membership 
and to ensure that Councils represent non-status and off-reserve interests comprehensively.
4.1. Ancestry
Full membership in the New Brunswick Aboriginal Peoples Council requires evidence of 
an Aboriginal ancestor since July 1, 1867, the date of confederation. This date is not 
internally significant but signals to settler governments that the Council understands itself 
as an organization that navigates the boundaries between settler society and Indigenous 
self-governance. The same aim is expressed differently by the Nova Scotia Native Council. 
The NCNS expressly references the definition in Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 
and reserves full membership to three groups of people: status Indians (or those eligible for 
status); people who do not qualify for status but who can document Aboriginal ancestry and 
community connection; and/or are treaty rights holders. In both of these versions, the nod to 
settler law is readily apparent in the cut-off date (NB) and in the definitional reference 
(NS). The PEI Council and NunatuKavut each take a slightly different approach. NCPEI 
requires evidence of ancestral membership in a historic Aboriginal community. This appears 
to include ancestry in a community outside of PEI as the term ‘Aboriginal’ is defined as 
referring to ‘the indigenous people of North America’. NunatuKavut requires evidence of 
‘Inuit descent [from a person] who is a member of the historic Inuit community of South/
Central Labrador.’ It is apparent that there is not a single approach to addressing the 
ancestral connection criterion but the common thread between the organizations is that 
evidence of ancestral connection is required. The date cut-offs (NB) and modes of managing 
mobility to (PEI) and from (NunatuKavut) traditional territories speak to a nuanced 
understanding that is largely absent from settler legislation and jurisprudence. 
4.2. Self-identification
All councils require that members self-identify. Again, the precise articulation of the 
requirement varies across councils. The most fulsome articulation comes from the NCPEI 
which requires: 
the prospective member must self-identify as a member of an Aboriginal community; 
the member must hold himself or herself out and believe or consider he or she is an 
Aboriginal. The prospective member should be proud of his or her Aboriginal ancestry 
and openly identify himself or herself as being of Aboriginal ancestry. 
Nova Scotia follows a similar line and requires members to: 
have for a minimum of 1 year declared themselves to be and hold themselves out to be 
a Native Aboriginal person.
A more minimal version can be found in the by-laws of the NBAPC and NunatuKavut 
which merely require that each prospective member apply personally. 
The variety in approaches seems to be less substantive but rather related to a varying 
allocation of evidence between self-identification and community acceptance. The minimal 
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approach suggests that the application itself is evidence of self-identification, while the 
more elaborate versions are closely connected to the next criterion, community acceptance 
in that evidence of being ‘out and proud’ supports acceptance by the relevant community. 
4.3. Community Acceptance
Community acceptance is also required by all councils but, again, there is variation in 
approach. In New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, the member must be accepted by the locals 
before an application to the Council. Applications must be endorsed by local membership 
clerk. This is connected to the idea that the relevant community is local. The Councils are 
organized in locals and zones whilst the Councils act as the organizational umbrella. 
NunatuKavut and NCPEI both understand themselves and act directly as the relevant 
communities for the purposes of community recognition. 
4.4. Additional Criteria
The membership processes in all Councils references additional criteria for admission 
beyond the Powley requirements. Intriguingly, this includes the imposition of a behavioural 
standard for membership in some cases. For example, the by-laws of the NBAPC require a 
member to subscribe to the aims, goals and objectives of the Council and contemplate 
exclusion from membership on the basis of the contravention of specific membership 
offences. Similarly, the Nova Scotia rules point to Mi’kmaq/Aboriginal culture, language, 
tradition and ideological affinity as factors supporting an application. 
4.5. Age
To be eligible for admission as an adult member, Native Councils in Atlantic Canada have 
set the minimum age at 16. This is different from federal law which sets the age of majority 
at 18 and provincial laws which variously set the age of majority at 18 or 19. The younger 
age of majority reflects a different understanding of the political role of youth compared to 
settler society. While Canadian settler society tends to see teenagers as children without 
political voice or community obligations, Indigenous people in the Atlantic region tend to 
stress the importance of listening to youth as a key constituency and also actively encourage 
political participation. This is consistent with a strong emphasis on political work as an 
intergenerational undertaking. Youth representatives and youth councils are further evidence 
of this approach. 
4.6. Residence requirements
All Councils require evidence of residence in the province or, in the case of Labrador, in the 
geographical area where they operate. Additionally, the three Maritime Councils (NBAPC, 
NCPEI and NCNS) require that members reside off-reserve.
4.7. Evidentiary requirements
All Councils require that membership applications be supported by documentary evidence. 
The integrity of the evidence is clearly important to the Councils. In the case of New 
Brunswick, all documents must either be provided in the original or certified copy. This is 
balanced by considerations of convenience and accessibility for members as is evident in 
the NunatuKavut by-laws, which contemplate a variety of formats. Evidentiary requirements 
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also recognize that prospective members may require assistance in assembling the 
information. NBAPC in its membership handbook provides guidance on resources. Local 
membership clerks also provide personal assistance. The ultimate burden of demonstrating 
Aboriginal ancestry remains with the applicant. 
The preponderance of evidentiary requirements relates to the proof of ancestry. Beyond 
this general observation, the approach taken to proving ancestry is again varied. For 
example, the NBAPC asks members to focus on one (either maternal or paternal) line, 
while NunatuKavut considers the entire family tree. 
The design of the evidentiary requirements shows how very aware the Councils are of 
the difficulties created by the under-inclusive Indian Act approach. The requirements are 
pragmatic and augmented by basket clauses permitting alternative proof subject to Board or 
Assembly approval. 
All Councils have fairly elaborate procedures for the admission of members including 
prescribed application forms, fees, prescribed timelines, documentary standards, designated 
staff, trained volunteers and internal appeals. These procedures afford a significant amount 
of procedural fairness and point to the importance of these processes to the organizations. 
While most procedures will be familiar to settler jurists from administrative law 
procedures in settler law, there are some subtle variations. One example is the retrospective 
reviewability of membership in light of new or evolving criteria. 
For example, the NCNS by-laws expressly preclude grand-parenting existing members 
if the criteria change: membership in the Association shall cease if he ceases to qualify for 
membership in accordance with these by-laws.
This suggests that the procedure makes room for evolving legal standards. It may also 
suggest that membership is not thought of as a vested right. A similar conclusion can be 
drawn from the NBAPC by-laws. Exclusion from membership is a remedy for a variety of 
membership offences.
The substantive criteria, evidentiary requirements and application procedures of Native 
Councils in Atlantic Canada are fully developed, align substantially with and tend to exceed 
the legal requirements in settler law and follow general administrative law principles of 
procedural fairness. They effectively address the shortcomings of under-inclusiveness and 
over-inclusiveness in the Indian Act regime by ensuring an appropriate balance between 
competing interests. Despite this, settler law recognition of Native Councils as communities 
of recognition has been spotty. Some courts and tribunals have recognized the membership 
cards of Native Councils, while others have refused to treat them as evidence of Indigeneity 
and/or treaty beneficiary status.46 The same is true for the political sphere. Some federal 
governments have treated CAP as a representative organization some of the time, others 
have not.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This article concludes with the question raised at the beginning – what is the relationship 
between constitutional recognition and constitutional imposition of identity? The Canadian 
state in its constitutional document describes itself as a liberal democracy governing a 
pluralist society. It also recognizes Aboriginal rights as constitutive. The first two elements 
have met with considerable success in terms of aligning state and citizen identity. This 
suggests that neutral constitutional identities or identities that respect individual diversity 
46 Hughes and Stewart (2015).
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can be imposed successfully through the democratic process. The flipside of this may very 
well be that the imposition of majoritarian, non-neutral impositions of constitutional 
identities will result in constitutional alienation. The third element of constitutional 
recognition of Aboriginal identities as constitutive of the Canadian state has proven much 
more difficult. The most promising avenue for advancing constitutional recognition of 
Indigenous Peoples appears to lie in respecting Indigenous self-governance over the process 
and criteria of recognition. The Canadian experience suggests that classical liberal and 
pluralist modes of constitutional identity are not effective in meeting decolonizing 
objectives. It also casts doubt on the promise of majoritarian imposition of non-neutral 
constitutional identities. 
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